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*Metropolitan Railway Terminal Accommodation, and its Effect on Traffic Results.* By WILLIAM ARTHUR WILKINSON, Esq.

[Read before the Statistical Society of London, 16th March, 1858.]

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I.—*Introduction.*

THE non-shareholding public is scarcely sufficiently aware of the interest which it has in the commercial success of the Railway System.

We hear, some day, that the Great Western Railway Company pays a half-year's dividend of only one-half per cent., and—unless we are amongst the list of shareholders—we merely shrug our shoulders, and are very sorry for *them*, without reflecting, however, that *that* 10s. dividend speaks of shortcomings to the public convenience—it may be to the public *safety*. We were told, for instance, at the last General Meeting that the improvement of this dividend from 10s. to 1l. per cent. had been effected, principally, by economy in the expenditure, diminution of the number of trains, &c. We may expect, therefore, that the public will be asked, to some extent at least, to *porter* their own luggage,—and we *know* that they will have less accommodation in the number of trains. To suppose that much economy is practicable without a diminution of public convenience, is to believe the Directors to have been negligent of their duty, since there has been nothing in the circumstances of this Company for some years past to warrant a lavish or unnecessary expenditure, and we have a right to conclude that as much economy has been already exercised as was consistent with the public convenience.

But if this diminution of expenditure be not attainable, except at the public cost, it becomes an important consideration for us all, whether it be really unavoidable,—whether, in short, an improvement in the condition of the Company is not to be sought in some other direction more in consonance with the public welfare. I believe this to be the case, and it will be my endeavour, in bringing the subject before the Society, to show that there are reasonable grounds for this belief.

Every day this subject becomes of greater importance. It is no longer a question whether we shall travel to Bath, or to Bristol by the York House or White Hart coach: if we cannot afford to post, and that at great inconvenience, we cannot even go by the waggon, we must go by the Great Western Railway—or walk.

II.—*Passenger and Goods Mileage Traffic, 1847 and 1857.*

Before I proceed further, however, with this question, it is proper to state, that I have been induced to examine it more closely from an interest which I have lately taken, at the instance of a friend, in a scheme for carrying a line of railway from Paddington to the Post-Office. The manifest interest which the Great Western Railway Company must have in such a scheme, led my friend to inquire minutely into the circumstances of this and the other railway companies having their termini in London, and the result of his inquiries is what I propose to lay before the Society, who will be pleased to remember that those results are his, and not mine.

It is alleged by the Directors of the Great Western Railway Company that the great depression of the condition of that Company is due to the number of miles of Branch Lines which have been constructed by them, and have not yet come into successful operation. There is, no doubt, something in this; but as other companies have made branch lines which have been unremunerative, we are obliged to seek in some other direction for the cause of the *relatively* unsatisfactory condition of the Great Western Railway Company.

We believe this cause is to be found in the faulty position of its Paddington Station, as regards the wants and convenience of the public; and we think we shall be able to show that all the railways which terminate in the metropolis have either increased their profits, or diminished their losses, in the ratio in which these wants and this convenience have been consulted in their Terminal arrangements.

The Great Western Railway affords the best illustration of this position, because, in the first place, the district through which it runs is, with respect to population, far above the districts traversed by other metropolitan railways, and is of a class and character the most likely to promote railway travelling, comprising, as it does, Windsor, Reading, Oxford, Bath, Bristol, Gloucester, and Cheltenham; and drawing the traffic, *as it does*, by means of contributory lines, from the West of England, and from Wales, through a country where it has been hitherto singularly free from competition. It ought, therefore, to compare favourably, as regards Traffic Receipts, with other metropolitan railways.

In the second place, it is the only railway company professing to accommodate the London traffic, which has done nothing towards

the improvement of the position of its London Terminus, although this terminus is the most remote of any from the heart of the metropolis. A glance at the map [*referring to a map exhibited when the Paper was read*] will show this. You will see there the black lines representing the metropolitan railways as they approach the metropolis and their original termini. The green lines, which you shall see presently, represent the additions or prolongations which have since been made in each case to reach the sources of the traffic.

It is fair to presume that, to the first of these causes, namely, to the large population of this district, and its character, was due the fact that, *ten years ago*, when little had been done towards the development of the London traffic, the Passenger Receipts per mile of this railway were the highest of six then open from London. It will be my business to show that, to the second of these causes is attributable the fact that it now stands fourth on the list in this respect.

It will be seen by reference to the Table I, that for the half-year, ending June, 1847, the Passenger receipts Per Mile were—

	£	
Of the <i>Great Western</i> .....	1,820	per mile.
„ London and North-Western .....	1,770	„
„ Brighton .....	1,205	„
„ South-Western .....	1,145	„
„ South-Eastern .....	1,135	„
„ Eastern Counties .....	745	„

Whilst for the same half-year of 1857 they were respectively—

Brighton .....	£1,450	or	£245	Increase	per mile.
South-Eastern .....	1,220	„	85	„	„
London and North-Western ....	1,210	„	560	Decrease	„
<i>Great Western</i> .....	1,070	„	750	„	„
South Western .....	1,050	„	95	„	„
Eastern Counties .....	605	„	140	„	„

It is observable here, that the Brighton and South-Eastern Railways, which enjoy, confessedly, the most convenient stations for the City Traffic, are the only two railways which have increased their Passenger Receipts in the last ten years; all the others having decreased, and that in the proportion to the general inconvenience of their stations for passenger traffic: the Great Western exhibits the largest decrease;—then the London and North-Western;—then the Eastern Counties;—and then the South-Western.

The Goods show a uniform increase, of which the London and North-Western, for reasons which will be hereafter given, is the greatest, although it started from the highest point ten years ago.

It is said, however, that this result of the Passenger Traffic, as regards the Great Western, is due to the large number of New Miles

opened by that Company in the course of the ten years, and, no doubt, this has been greater than in the case of any other of the six companies, being 172 per cent. upon the mileage open in 1847. But let us look a little closer at this part of the case.

III.—*Great Western Railway compared with other Metropolitan Lines.—Passenger Traffic.*

As regards the six railways already alluded to, Table II shows the number of miles open, the Receipts for Passengers, the same Receipts per mile;—the Receipts for Goods, the same per mile;—the Total Goods and Passengers per mile;—and the dividend paid at three different half-years, ending in June, 1847, 1852, and 1857; the first line being for 1847—the second for 1852—and the third for 1857. The Table (II) shows, likewise, the miles open in 1857, and those open in 1847.

The Great Northern is excluded, because it was not open at the commencement of the decade. Of course the only fair comparison is in the receipts *per Mile*.

If we examine this Table (II) we shall find that, whilst the Great Western Company has opened, since the half-year ending June, 1847, 172 per cent. of new mileage, its Passenger Receipts for the half-year ending June, 1857, are less, by 41 per cent., than they were for the former half-year. Now it will be seen, that the London Bridge Railways—the Brighton and South Eastern—which have a convenient City terminus, have likewise increased their mileage, respectively, by 52 and 101 per cent., or, in the mean,  $76\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., and, according to the Great Western rate of depreciation, their Passenger Receipts per mile ought to be, for 1857, 18 per cent. *less*; instead of which they were, respectively, 20 per cent. and 7 per cent., or, in the mean,  $13\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. *more*, in the latter half-year, than in the former, thus showing a disproportion as against the Great Western, with its Paddington Station, of  $31\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.—or equal, upon its last half-year's receipts, to 337*l.* per mile, or 302,626*l.* per annum. That is to say, that, unless some other cause than the mere increase of its mileage, has been operating, unfavourably, upon Great Western affairs, and supposing its opportunities to have been equal to those of the Brighton and South-Eastern, it ought to have received more for passengers in the last half-year than it *did* receive by 302,626*l.*—a sum, after deducting its stated working expenses of 42 per cent., equal to 175,000*l.*, or more than 2 per cent. per annum on its ordinary share capital. This is exemplified, although to a less extent, by reference to the state of the other companies.

The South Western, with its Waterloo Terminus, has opened during the same period 111 per cent. of new mileage, and its Passenger Receipts per mile ought, by the same rule, to be 26 per cent.

less; whereas they were only 8 per cent. less, showing a disproportion against the Great Western of 18 per cent., or 172,955*l.* per annum.

The Eastern Counties, with a station at Shoreditch, has opened 100 per cent. of new mileage, and, instead of a depreciation in its Passenger Receipts, per mile, of 24 per cent. as there ought to have been, they are only 20 per cent. less, showing a disproportion against the Great Western of 4 per cent., or 38,435*l.* per annum.

Nor can it be said that the new miles opened by the Great Western are in more barren districts than those of the other railways: on the contrary, the latter compare most unfavourably with the former in population and fertility of traffic.

The London and North Western is the only one of the six metropolitan lines which shows, in comparison with the Great Western, an undue depreciation of Passenger Receipts, per mile, with reference to its increase of mileage. This depreciation ought to have been, by the rule to which we have adverted, 16 per cent.: it was actually 32 per cent., or 16 per cent. in *favour* of the *Great Western*. But the passenger station of the London and North Western Company is likewise very inconvenient for the City traffic, and this Company has been subjected to extraordinary competition during the last five years by the opening of the Great Northern Railway, on the one side, and the extension of the Great Western line to Birmingham, Wolverhampton, and the Mersey, on the other.

It cannot be true, therefore, that the depreciation of the Great Western Passenger Receipts, per mile, has been caused entirely by the construction of new lines, because all the other metropolitan companies have increased their mileage; none have suffered to the same extent as the Great Western, and some have even increased their receipts per mile under this operation.

#### IV.—*Goods Traffic.—Comparative Statements.*

Having said thus much upon the Passenger Traffic of these several railways, let me draw your attention, for a short time, to the Goods Traffic, which shows, in a still more remarkable degree, the efficacy of convenient terminal arrangements.

It will be seen that there is no case of actual decrease of Goods Traffic, even per mile, upon any of these lines. There is, of course, no decrease of the gross traffic any where, although there is a decrease of Passenger Traffic *per mile* in four cases out of the six. If we examine the middle line, which represents the state of affairs in 1852, we shall find that in that year the Passenger Traffic per mile was in all cases depressed, but that in 1857 this depression was more or less recovered, except in the cases of the Great Western and the London and North Western Companies; so in the Goods Traffic the same depression occurs in all cases except those of the Eastern Counties

and the Brighton, and it is in all cases more than recovered in 1857.

The Goods Traffic of the London and North Western in 1847 was nearly twice as great as that of the Great Western, and more than twice as great as that of any other of the six railways. Yet it was depressed in 1852 in the same proportion as the Great Western, although at that time little or no competition existed with the Great Northern or Great Western Companies.

But about that time the Great Northern was opened on the one side and the Great Western extended on the other, and to that competition was, no doubt, due the circumstance that, from the depression in the Passenger Traffic, per mile, of the London and North Western, no recovery took place; but, on the contrary, a still further depression occurred, and in 1857 the Passenger Traffic, per mile, on that railway was less than it had been even in 1852, although that of all the other railways, except the Great Western, had increased.

Now, it was natural to expect that the Goods Traffic would follow the fate of the Passenger Traffic, and that the same competition, which was equally opened upon both in 1852, would have had a similar result upon both in 1857, and, if that had been so, the plight of the London and North Western would have been little better than that of the Great Western, and we should have had a dividend nearly as relatively low in the one case as in the other. But what did take place, and that in the face of this severe competition? The Goods Traffic on the London and North Western Railway, which had fallen from 900*l.* per mile in 1847 to 865*l.* in 1852, during which time there had been no competition, rose in 1857 to 1,235*l.* per mile, in the teeth of the severe competition to which I have referred.

And why was this? In 1852 was opened the *North London Railway*, which had been wisely fostered and prepared by the London and North Western Company, at an expense of nearly 800,000*l.* That line of railway at once transferred the Goods terminus of the London and North Western Railway from Camden Town to the Minories and the Docks, and placed it, to use the words of a committee of consultation, "in an impregnable position as regards the commerce of the City of London"—a position, in short, to defy competition unless from similar action on the part of its rivals. Is it too much to say, that to this circumstance it is mainly due, that the London and North-Western has continued to pay a dividend of 2*l.* 10*s.* for the half-year, whilst that of its rival, the Great Western, has declined to 10*s.*?

In order to appreciate this statement, let us suppose that the Goods Traffic of the London and North Western had followed the same ratio of depreciation as the Passenger Traffic. We have seen that the depreciation of the Passenger Traffic of the

London and North Western was 16 per cent. greater than, by the rule of new mileage opened, compared with the Great Western, it ought to have been, and this 16 per cent. was, no doubt, due to the severe competition to which I have referred.

Now, if the competition in Passenger Traffic caused a depreciation of 16 per cent. in the receipts, it ought, supposing it to be equally severe upon the Goods (and it was probably more so) to have caused a similar depreciation there likewise. If this had been so, then, as an increased mileage of 172 per cent. on the Great Western produced an increase in the Goods Receipts of 19 per cent.: an increase in the mileage of the London and North Western of 69 per cent. ought to have given an increase of the Goods Traffic per mile of 5 per cent. The Goods Traffic mileage receipts of the London and North Western would therefore have stood thus:—

Goods Traffic.—Decrease by competition .....	16	per cent.
„ less Increase by new mileage .....	5	„
<hr/>		
Which would leave .....	11	„

as the rate of decrease at which the Goods Receipts, per mile, of the London and North Western would have stood if the depreciation of the goods had followed the rate of depreciation of the passenger traffic.

But there was actually an increase of 37 per cent. in 1857 instead of a decrease of 11 per cent., which together makes a difference of 48 per cent., which may be fairly assumed to be due to the new stations at the Minorities and the Docks, which are so admirably adapted for goods, although they have failed to arrest the depreciation of the passenger traffic. Now, 48 per cent. on 900*l.*, the mileage receipt of the half-year of 1847 is 432*l.*, which, multiplied by the number of miles (637), is equal to 275,000*l.* for the half-year, or 550,000*l.* per annum, which, after deducting 40 per cent. for working expenses, leaves a net sum of 330,000*l.* per annum, nearly equal to  $1\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. upon the share capital of the London and North Western Railway, attributable to improved Terminal arrangements.

#### V.—*Actual Effects of Central Termini already opened.*

I have thus shown that the Great Western Passenger Receipts are less than they ought to be, upon comparison with other metropolitan railways, by some 300,000*l.* per annum; and unless it can be proved that the Great Western Company labours under other disadvantages, and I contend that the reverse is the fact, I think I have a right to attribute this loss to the unfortunate position of its terminus.

Again, I have shown that the Goods Receipts of the London and North Western Company are more than 500,000*l.* above what they



would have been had they followed the ratio of its Passenger Receipts, which have greatly fallen off, and when I find that a Goods' Station has been constructed on this railway which enormously facilitates the Goods Traffic, and affords little or no advantage to that of passengers, I think I have an equal right to attribute the improvement in the one case, and the falling off in the other, to the efficiency and the inefficiency of the station accommodations, as regards Goods Traffic on the one hand, and Passenger Traffic on the other.

The other Metropolitan railway companies have not been insensible to the value of good terminal arrangements, and every one of them, except the Great Western, has effected some improvement in the position of its Passenger or Goods' Stations, often of both.

We have seen what has been done by the London and North Western.

The Brighton and South Eastern have carried their Goods' Stations to the Bricklayers' Arms from New Cross. The first of these is distant from London Bridge only  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles—the latter  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles.

The Brighton has likewise just determined to raise nearly half-a-million of money to obtain a West-end station at Pimlico; and the South Eastern is projecting a station at Charing-cross.

The South Western has carried its Passenger Station from Nine Elms to Waterloo-road, and *did* propose to come on to London Bridge, and was only deterred by monetary considerations.

The Eastern Counties has made a communication through the Blackwall Railway to Fenchurch Street, and the Blackwall has prolonged its terminus from the Minories to that place.

Now, let us see with what effect all these improvements have been attended.

The gross receipts of the Blackwall Railway for 32 weeks, *after* its extension to Fenchurch Street, were larger by nearly 50 per cent. than they had been for the corresponding weeks of the year *before* the extension.

The Goods' Station of the South Eastern Company was removed from New Cross to the Bricklayers' Arms in 1844, and the gross Goods Receipts for the half-year *after* the removal (with an additional mileage of 20 per cent.), were 84 per cent. larger than those for the corresponding half-year *before* the removal;—whilst the Great Western gross Goods Receipts for the same half-year (with an additional mileage of 16 per cent.) gave an increase of only 30 per cent., showing a greater ratio of increase in the South Eastern of some 37 per cent., attributable, apparently, to the more convenient station.

The Brighton Goods' Station was removed from New Cross to the Bricklayers' Arms in November, 1847, and in five years afterwards their gross Goods Receipts (with an additional mileage of 44 per cent.) had increased 100 per cent.; whereas the Great Western

gross Goods Receipts during the same five years (with an additional mileage of 60 per cent.) had increased only 55 per cent., showing a difference due to the more convenient station of 81 per cent.

The Passenger Station of the South Western Company was extended in 1848 from Nine Elms to the Waterloo Road, about a mile and a quarter, and the gross Passenger Receipts for the year ending June, 1849, after the extension (with a mileage increase of  $9\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.), were larger by 15 per cent. than they were for the year before the extension; whilst the Great Western gross Passenger Receipts for the same years, with an increased mileage of 16 per cent., exhibit an increase of only  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., making a difference between the receipts of the two companies, with reference to their mileage, of 25 per cent., apparently due to the extension of the South Western Station to Waterloo Road.

The gross Goods Receipts of the London and North Western (with nearly an equal mileage) were greater by 140,000*l.* for the year *after* the extension of the Goods' Station from Camden-town to Haydon Square than they were for the year before that extension, although the increase of the previous year over its predecessor was only 15,000*l.*; showing an increased receipt, apparently due to the extension, of 125,000*l.* in the year.

Now it is fair to ask, what would have been the present position of the South Western, the London and North Western, the Brighton, or the South Eastern Companies if their principal stations had remained, respectively, at Nine Elms, at Camden Town, or at New Cross?

Is it unfair to answer, very nearly the present position of the Great Western?

If we are right in this conclusion, it may be well to attempt to reduce into figures the actual loss to the Great Western Railway Company occasioned by the distance of its Paddington Station from the City. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to fix the precise amount of this loss, because there are disturbing causes which necessarily affect the receipts of the different metropolitan railways; but the following statement will furnish some idea of its magnitude:—

The Passenger Receipts per mile of the London Bridge railways were, in 1847, for the half-year, some 600*l.* *less* than those of the Great Western; and for the last half-year of 1857, after ten years of development of the London traffic, they are some 300*l.* *more*; making together a difference of 900*l.* per mile for the half-year, or 1,800*l.* for the year, equal on the 449 miles of the Great Western to more than 800,000*l.*, or, deducting 40 per cent. for working expenses, equal to 6 per cent. on its ordinary share capital of 8,000,000*l.*

Again, the Goods Receipts per mile of the Great Western were, for the half-year ending June, 1847, *before* the Haydon Square Station

of the London and North Western Railway was opened, only 415*l.* less than those of the London and North Western; and for the half-year ending June, 1857, *after* the station at Haydon Square was opened, they were 680*l.* less, making a difference against the Great Western of 265*l.* per mile for the half-year, or 530*l.* per mile for the year, equal, on the 449 miles of the Great Western, to 238,000*l.*, or, deducting working expenses, to a further 1½ per cent. on the ordinary share capital of that company.

There does not appear to be anything in the circumstances of the Great Western Company, if we consider the natural sources of traffic which its district presents and its comparative freedom from competition, to account for these results, except the remoteness of its Paddington Station from the haunts of commerce, and its necessary incompatibility with the development of Suburban traffic—a traffic the most profitable of any to which the railway system is adapted.

To assume that, if the Great Western Railway were extended to a station as convenient for the London passengers as the London Bridge Station, its Passenger Receipts would be increased to the extent of 800,000*l.* per annum, or that a city dépôt would add 238,000*l.* per annum to its Goods Receipts, may, perhaps, be considered extravagant; and yet there might be adduced, as many good reasons, why, with these facilities, it should attain an addition to its receipts exceeding this 1,038,000*l.*, as can be suggested for their falling short of that sum.

#### VI.—*Conclusion.—Proposed Remedies.*

And now, having stated why we think that the public, apart from the immediate proprietors, have an abiding interest in the commercial prosperity of the railway system, and having endeavoured to explain, I am afraid at too great length, the chief, if not the only cause to which, as we think, the want of this prosperity in the case of the Great Western Railway is attributable, I am glad to be able to present to you, with some confidence, what we believe to be the remedy of this evil. This remedy, we presume, will be found, not in paring down the conveniences of the public, but in a large increase to these conveniences by the construction of a new line of railway.

This new railway is proposed to commence at Paddington by a junction with the Great Western Railway, and to terminate at St. Martin's-le-Grand, opposite the Post-Office—a point for the City passengers more convenient even than London Bridge; whilst, for those in the central portions of the metropolis, there would be stations at Clerkenwell, King's Cross, Tottenham-court Road, Baker Street, &c. There can be no question, therefore, that this railway

would convert the Great Western from the least convenient to the most convenient railway for the London passengers. A depôt for goods at Farringdon Street would be nearer to the large warehousemen in St. Paul's Churchyard, Cheapside, Wood Street, &c.; and more convenient for the general trade of London than the depôt at Haydon Square; whilst a coal depôt at Clerkenwell would be far more central for the coal trade than that possessed by the Great Northern Company at Maiden-lane.

But this, which is called the "Metropolitan Railway," presents other advantages to the general public.

It will not only afford ready and cheap access between the north-western and south-eastern parts of the metropolis, but it will relieve the streets of London from a large portion of that goods traffic which has of late years become so great a nuisance.

The Act for this railway was obtained some four years since with the almost universal consent of all parties: it possesses peculiar powers: it passes through the greater portion of its length without invading property of house or land, and can be constructed, therefore, at proportionately small cost. Why it has not been constructed already is easy of explanation—it may suffice to the present Company to know that a last effort is now being made for its completion.

TABLE I.

METROPOLITAN RAILWAYS.—*Comparison of the First Six Months of 1847 and 1857 as regards Mileage Results.*

PASSENGER RECEIPTS <i>Per Mile for</i> <i>Half-year ending June, 1847.</i>		PASSENGER RECEIPTS <i>Per Mile for</i> <i>Half Year ending June, 1857.</i>	
	£		£
<i>Great Western</i> .....	1,820	Brighton .....	1,450 Inc. 245
London and North-Western .....	1,770	South-Eastern .....	1,220 „ 85
Brighton .....	1,205	London and N. Westn. 1,210 Dec. 560	
South-Western .....	1,145	<i>Great Western</i> .....	1,070 „ 750
South-Eastern .....	1,135	South-Western .....	1,050 „ 95
Eastern Counties .....	745	Eastern Counties.....	605 „ 140
GOODS RECEIPTS <i>Per Mile for Half</i> <i>Year ending June, 1847.</i>		GOODS RECEIPTS <i>Per Mile for Half</i> <i>Year ending June, 1857.</i>	
	£		£
London and North-Western.....	900	London and N. Westn. 1,235 Inc. 335	
<i>Great Western</i> .....	485	Eastern Counties .....	705 „ 280
Eastern Counties .....	425	<i>Great Western</i> .....	575 „ 90
South-Western .....	320	South-Western .....	380 „ 60
South-Eastern .....	230	Brighton .....	370 „ 155
Brighton.....	215	South-Eastern.....	340 „ 110

TABLE II.

METROPOLITAN RAILWAYS.—*Mileage, Passengers, and Goods for Half-Years ended June 1847, 1852, and 1857.*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Mileage.	Total Receipts from Passengers	Receipts Per Mile.	Total Receipts for Goods, &c.	Receipts Per Mile.	Total Goods and Passengers Per Mile.	Dividend Per Cent. Per Annum.
	No.	£	£	£	£	£	£ s. d.
South-Westrn. 1847	131	150,000	1,145	42,000	320	1,465	3 15 -
„ 1852	242	214,000	885	67,000	275	1,160	1 12 6
„ 1857	277	290,000	1,050	10,500	380	1,430	2 7 6
Brighton ..... 1847	121	146,000	1,205	26,000	215	1,430	2 - -
„ 1852	174	185,000	1,060	52,000	300	1,360	1 12 -
„ 1857	184	267,000	1,450	68,000	370	1,820	2 10 -
South-Eastern 1847	150	170,000	1,135	35,000	230	1,365	2 2 -
„ 1852	275	278,000	1,010	60,000	220	1,230	1 5 -
„ 1857	301	367,000	1,220	102,000	340	1,560	1 10 -
Eastn. Counties 1847	244	184,000	745	104,000	425	1,180	2 10 -
„ 1852	417	231,000	555	207,000	495	1,050	1 - -
„ 1857	489	296,000	605	345,000	705	1,310	1 5 -
Lond. & N. W. 1847	378	670,000	1,770	340,000	900	2,670	4 10 -
„ 1852	540	669,000	1,240	467,500	865	2,105	2 15 -
„ 1857	637	770,000	1,210	787,000	1,235	2,445	2 10 -
Great Western 1847	165	300,000	1,820	80,000	485	2,305	4 - -
„ 1852	263	315,000	1,200	124,000	470	1,670	2 - -
„ 1857	449	480,000	1,070	258,000	575	1,645	- 10 -

TABLE III.

METROPOLITAN RAILWAYS.—*Effects on Goods Traffic of Central Depôts.*

<i>Blackwall Railway.</i> —Receipts 32 weeks preceding extension .....	£ 17,314
<i>Extension to Fenchurch Street, 1841.</i>	
Receipts 32 weeks after extension .....	25,318
Increase 50 per Cent. ....	8,004

*South-Eastern.*

	Miles Open.	£
Goods Receipts, 6 months ending March, 1844 .....	82	8,950
<i>Extension to Bricklayer's Arms, 1844.</i>		
„ 6 months ending March, 1845 .....	98	16,546
(20 p. ct.) 16 (84 p. ct.)		7,546

TABLE III.—*Continued.**Great Western.*

	Miles Open.	£
Goods Receipts, 6 months ending December, 1843.....	190 .....	64,300
"                    "                    "                    1844.....	221 .....	83,400
	(16 p. ct.) 31    (30 p. ct.)	<u>19,100</u>

*South-Western.*

	Miles Open.	£
Passenger Receipts, 6 months ending June, 1847 .....	194 .....	363,215
<i>Extension to Waterloo,</i> 1848.		
"                    6 months ending June, 1849 .....	210 .....	419,725
	(9½ p. ct.) 16    (18 p. ct.)	<u>56,510</u>

*Great Western.*

	Miles Open.	£
Passenger Receipts, 6 months ending June, 1847 .....	264 .....	698,628
"                    "                    "                    1849 .....	306 .....	716,090
	(16 p. ct.) 42    (2½ p. ct.)	<u>17,462</u>

*London and North-Western.*

	£
Goods Receipts, 12 months ending June, 1851 .....	931,461
"                    "                    "                    1852 (nearly same Mileage) .....	946,472
Increase over 1851 .....	<u>15,011</u>

*Haydon Square opened about June, 1852.*

"                    12 months ending June, 1853 .....	1,085,630
Increase over 1852 .....	139,158
Increase of one year over the other ....	124,000